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NOTES
DEFINITION OF A SECURITY:
LANDRETH TIMBER Co. v. LANDRETH
N 1977 Ivan Landreth and his two sons offered to sell their business,
Landreth Timber Company. Samuel Dennis and John Bolten subse-
quently purchased the timber company. The sale involved the transfer
of one hundred percent of Landreth Timber Company's stock to B&D Com-
pany, a corporation the buyers formed to purchase the timber company.'
The business soon proved unsuccessful and went into receivership. Lan-
dreth Timber Company then filed suit against the Landreths, the sellers, in
the federal court for the Western District of Washington claiming damages
of $2,500,000 for violations of the fraud and civil liability provisions of the
Securities Act of 19332 and the misrepresentation and fraud provision of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for a summary judgment,
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the stock at issue failed to meet
the statutory definition of a security and thus was not entitled to the protec-
tion of the securities laws. 4 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a sale of one
hundred percent of a company's stock is not a transaction involving a secur-
ity because the purchaser is not a true investor, but an owner of the business
through the transfer of control.5 An investor relies on the efforts of others to
make a profit, while an owner relies on his own efforts to make a profit. 6
Before Landreth this concept, commonly known as the sale of business doc-
trine, had caused a split among the circuit courts.7 To settle the issue the
1. Rather than a simple sale of the company's assets, Ivan Landreth required the pur-
chasers to buy the company's stock.
2. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1982).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
4. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984). The
1933 Act defines a security quite broadly through an extensive list of investment devices that
includes stock. Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982). This section contains a
clause that prevents any of the investment devices listed from being termed a security if the
context in which the device is used so warrants. Id. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b. The definition of a
security within the context of the 1934 Act is essentially the same. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982); see Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36
(1967); see also infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing definition of security under
the Acts).
5. 731 F.2d at 1351-52; see SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293, 301 (1946).
6. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
7. The Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had previously held that a sale of stock did
not constitute a security when accompanied by a transfer of control. See Christy v. Cambron,
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Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed: If an instrument pos-
sesses the label and traditional characteristics of stock, it constitutes a secur-
ity within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and an analysis of the underlying transaction is un-
necessary. 105 S. Ct. 2297, 85 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1985).
I. DEFINITION OF SECURITY UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
The definitions of the regulated securities under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are essentially the same. 8 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has treated the definitions as identical when determining
whether particular instruments are included in the respective definitions. 9
Congress passed the Acts in response to the 1929 stockmarket crash 0 to
restore the investing public's confidence in the financial markets." To
achieve this goal, Congress focused its concern on regulation of the securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets. 12 An examination of the legisla-
tive cupboard, however, for the drafters' intended meaning of the term "se-
curity" reveals little. 13  The statutes contain no more than a laundry list
stating that, unless the "context" requires otherwise, a security includes, in-
ter alia, any note, stock, bond, investment contract, mineral royalty or lease,
certificate of deposit, or option. 14 The only other guideline offered is that the
710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1982); King v.
Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 345 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 465
(7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1981); Chandler v.
Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 444 (10th Cir. 1977) (opinion ordered published 1982). The Second,
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits had previously rejected the sale of business doctrine. See
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1983); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc.,
696 F.2d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 1982); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982);
Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 35 n.3 (3d Cir. 1979) (literal reading of Act requires rejection
of sale of business doctrine); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255, 1261
(4th Cir. 1974).
8. For the definition of a security under the Acts see infra note 14.
9. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2302 n.1, 85 L. Ed. 2d 692,
697 n.1 (1985) (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982)); United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
335-36 (1967).
10. See Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transac-
tional Context-Based Analysis for Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW. 929, 932
(1984); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 613 (1964);
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30
(1959).
11. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 (1982); H. BLOOMENTHAL, CASES &
MATERIALS ON SECURITIES LAW 9 (1966); M. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION & THE
NEW DEAL 43 (1970); Easley, supra note 10, at 932; Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a
Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock Is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 234-35 (1982).
12. See Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1983).
13. See Easley, supra note 10, at 950 n.166; Knauss, supra note 10, at 613; Landis, supra
note 10, at 29; Note, Repudiating the Sale-of-Business Doctrine, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1718,
1728 (1983); see also M. PARISH, supra note 11, at 113 (origin of 1934 Act unclear).
14. The Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982) provides:
When used in this title ... unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
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definition of a security should be broadly construed to include those instru-
ments and devices commonly referred to and thought of as a security. 15
Because Congress failed to describe the characteristics that distinguish se-
curities from nonsecurities, courts have fashioned their own concepts of
what the definitions cover. Courts that have embraced the sale of business
doctrine limit the Acts' coverage to instruments held by true investors and
exclude from coverage instruments held by entrepreneurs. 16 Courts that
have rejected the sale of business doctrine argue that Congress intended the
definition of security to include stock received in the sale of a business even
though a transfer of control accompanied the stock transfer. 17 These courts
do not view the terms investor and entrepreneur as mutually exclusive.18
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate of de-
posit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "secur-
ity," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certif-
icate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982) provides:
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, deben-
ture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or
in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certifi-
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, invest-
ment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit,
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance, which
has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive
of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise
limited.
15. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933); see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 555-56 (1982); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975);
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144
(2d Cir. 1982); Easley, supra note 10, at 932, 950 n.166; Thompson, supra note 11, at 230;
Note, supra note 13, at 1728.
16. See Christy v. Cambron, 710 F,2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983); Sutter v. Groen, 687
F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344-45 (11th Cir. 1982); Freder-
iksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1981). These cases distinguished investors
from entrepreneurs by focusing on whether the buyer gains control over his purchase. See
Thompson, supra note 11, at 235-36, 240-41. If he has, the purchaser is not an investor. Id.
An investor relies on others for potential profit. Id.
17. See Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500-04 (5th Cir. 1983); Golden v. Garafalo, 678
F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Note, supra note 13, at 1725 (Congress intended that
courts should examine instrument, not transaction).
18. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 334 (3d Cir. 1984); Golden v. Garafalo,
678 F.2d 1139, 1146 (2d Cir. 1982); Note, supra note 13, at 1738-39; see also Sutter v. Groen,
687 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982) (purchaser may be both investor and entrepreneur). But see




II. DEFINITION OF SECURITY: FLESHING IT OUT IN THE COURTS
In SEC v. C.M Joiner Leasing Corp.19 the Supreme Court for the first
time delved into the intricacy of what constitutes a security under the
Acts.20 At issue in Joiner were various leasehold interests in land adjacent
to proposed oil well sites. The Court held that the unusual leasehold instru-
ments involved constituted investment contracts entitled to the protection of
the Acts.21 The Court observed that the Acts' coverage extended beyond the
familiar concepts of a security.22 The Court refused to accept that an instru-
ment must wear one of the labels contained in the definition of security to
receive treatment as a security under the Acts. 23 Nevertheless, the Court
suggested that a literal reading of the definition required the inclusion of the
leasehold interests within the definition of "security. ' 24 Labels such as
stock, note, or bond on the face of an instrument could bring an instrument
such as a leasehold interest within the definition of security.25
Only three years later the Court decided SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 26 This
case involved the sale of units of citrus grove acreage coupled with an op-
tional service contract for cultivating and marketing the fruit and returning
the net proceeds of the fruit sales to the buyer. Although optional, the vast
majority of buyers chose the service contract because they had no back-
ground in caring for citrus trees. The lure of substantial profits attracted
buyers who typically bought little more than one acre. 27 Examining the sub-
stance of the offer instead of its form, the Court found that the service con-
tract at issue constituted an investment contract covered by the scope of the
definition of "security." '28 The Court formulated a test the vitality of which
remains unabated: An investment scheme falls under the Acts' definition of
security if the scheme involves investment of money in a common enterprise
the profits of which result solely from the labor of others. 29 The facts of
Howey clearly met this test. The Howey test reflected a dynamic principle
designed to protect investors from the boundless schemes created by those
19. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
20. Id. at 345.




25. Id. at 355. In United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850 (1975), the
Supreme Court characterized as dictum the Joiner Court's conclusion that a more general
type of interest could fit one of the specific labels of the Acts.
26. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
27. Id. at 296. The defendant, W.J. Howey Co., represented to buyers that returns of over
20% were possible.
28. Id. at 299.
29. Id. at 301. The Court based this test on state court interpretations of investment
contracts under local blue-sky laws. See People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, 12 P.2d 1078,
1081 (1932); State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425, 426-27 (1922); Stevens v. Liberty
Packing Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193, 195 (Ch. 1932); State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135, 153




hoping to attract investors' money through the lure of profits.30
Courts that endorsed the sale of business doctrine managed to use the
Howey test to support their position. Those courts argued that if the buyer
purchased one hundred percent of the transferring company's stock, he
could not meet the first condition of the test, investment in a common enter-
prise.31 Ownership of all of the stock precluded having an enterprise in
common with others. 32
The Court continued to expand the definition of security in Tcherepnin v.
Knight.33 That case considered whether the definition of security included
withdrawable capital shares in a savings and loan. Employing the Howey
test, the Court held that the shares constituted securities. 34 The shares fell
within the test's scope since the shareholders participated in the common
enterprise of money lending, the success of which depended upon the busi-
ness acumen of the savings and loan's managers. 35 The shareholders could
anticipate a return on their investment only if the savings and loan proved
profitable because Illinois state law conditioned the payment of dividends on
withdrawable capital shares upon an apportionment of profits.3 6 The Knight
Court became the first court to include in its definitional analysis the prefa-
tory clause to the Acts' definition of security, "unless the context otherwise
requires."'37
Supporters of the sale of business doctrine emphasized the prefatory
clause.38 They viewed "context" as referring to the transaction in which a
security was exchanged and felt that a transaction involving the sale of a
company was a context that did not require invocation of the Acts. 39 Oppo-
nents saw "context" as referring to the use of the term "security" in other
statutes.4o
30. 328 U.S. at 299. The Howey test brought many investment schemes within the scope
of the Acts. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 231; Note, supra note 13, at 1729.
31. Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1981); accord Chandler v.
Kew Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 444 (10th Cir. 1977) (opinion ordered published 1982) (securities laws
failed to protect purchaser of company who also bought the company's stock because stock
was mere indicia of ownership); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 378, 384
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (plaintiffs failed to recover because they alone had a financial stake in the
purchased company); Anchor-Darling Indus. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(plaintiff who relied on himself for profits did not fall under protection of the Securities Acts).
32. Courts also found no common enterprise in cases where the seller received an employ-
ment contract or an override interest. See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1152 (7th
Cir. 1981); Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952, 958 (N.D. I11. 1981).
33. 389 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1967).
34. Id. at 338-39.
35. Id. at 338.
36. Id. at 338-39.
37. Id. at 335; see supra note 14.
38. See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-52 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Thomp-
son, supra note 11, at 251-52 (sale of business doctrine need not rely on prefatory clause due to
traditional principles of statutory interpretation). But see SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 466 (1969) (prefatory clause refers to the context of security as used in other statutes);
Note, supra note 13, at 1726 (prefatory clause used to escape bizarre applications of the Acts).
39. See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1981); Seagrave Corp. v.
Vista Resources, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 378, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F.
Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
40. See Note, supra note 13, at 1728 n.71.
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Joiner, Howey, and Knight demonstrated the Court's desire to construe
the Acts' definition of security broadly. Not until 1975, in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,41 did the Court narrow its view. Forman in-
volved the transfer of what at first glance appeared a traditional security,
shares of stock in a nonprofit housing cooperative. Purchase of the shares
entitled the buyer to lease low-cost apartments.
The Court engaged in a bifurcated analysis. The first section of the
Court's opinion examined whether labeling an instrument as stock created
protection for the transaction under the Acts. The second part of the analy-
sis considered whether the instrument fell within the definition of an invest-
ment contract or other instrument generally known as a security. The Court
answered "no" to both questions.42
The Court, relying on the substance over form doctrine, 43 declined to find
that the label "stock" afforded to the sale of the housing cooperative shares
protection under the securities laws.44 The Court argued that the economic
realities behind the transaction, not the instrument's label, invoke the pro-
tection of the Acts since securities transactions are economic by nature.45
The spirit of the statute might exclude a term explicitly included in the lan-
guage of the statute.46
Backing up a step, the Court explained that an instrument's label does
have some relation to the definition of security.47 A traditional label, in
some circumstances, might cause a buyer to believe that the securities laws
protected him. 48 For example, if the underlying transaction incorporated
several important attributes commonly related to instruments that are la-
beled in the same manner as legitimate securities, a buyer could mistakenly
believe the Acts afforded him protection when in fact they did not.49 The
Court concluded that the purchasers in Forman, however, could not have
thought that the Acts covered their transaction because the instrument had
none of the traits commonly associated with stock.50 Characteristics usually
associated with stock included payment of dividends dependent upon profits,
transferability, use as collateral, voting rights proportionate to the number of
shares owned, and potential for appreciation. 51
The second part of the two-step analysis, whether the instruments consti-
41. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
42. Id. at 846-47. The Court prefaced its two-step analysis by referring to Howey, 328
U.S. at 293, as the guiding principle in this type of security analysis. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848.
43. The substance over form doctrine disregards the form of the transaction and focuses
instead on the actual economic consequences of the transaction. See Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
44. 421 U.S. at 848.
45. Id. at 849.
46. Id. The Court rejected the tenants' reliance on Joiner. Id. The Joiner Court's use of
conditional language showed that the Court would inquire into the transaction's economic
substance when necessary. 320 U.S. at 351, 355.
47. 421 U.S. at 850.
48. Id.
49. Id.




tuted investment contracts or instruments commonly known as securities,
focused once again on the transaction's economic realities and not the la-
bel.5 2 Further, the Court, for analytical purposes, equated an investment
contract with an instrument commonly known as a security.53 Applying the
Howey test, the Court found that the housing cooperative scheme attracted
buyers only to a place to live, not to expected profits.54 Thus, the stock at
issue did not fall within the definition of security.55 At the opinion's conclu-
sion the Court restated the Howey test, but substantially altered the third
part of the test. Anticipated profits no longer needed to come solely from
the efforts of others; the investor himself could participate in generating
profits so long as he also relied on the efforts of others.56
Lower courts used Forman as a catalyst to give birth to the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 57 These courts saw Forman as endorsing an examination of
the economic reality of a stock sale in all instances.5" If economic reality
demonstrated that the sale of stock was merely a byproduct of the sale of a
business, the securities laws did not apply. 59 Proponents of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine also used the third element of the Howey test, as modified by
Forman,6° to exclude some stock sales from the Acts' coverage. 61 A pur-
chaser who in reality buys control of a business does not rely on the efforts of
others to produce a profit. 62 Furthermore, some courts interpreted the mod-
ification of the Howey test to imply that the Acts would not come into play
in transactions in which the purchaser did not buy all of the business's stock,
52. Id. at 851-52.
53. Id. at 852. One commentator found this comparison significant because stock consti-
tutes an instrument commonly considered as a security. Thus, the Howey test applied equally
to stock transactions. Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine
under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637, 667 (1982).
54. 421 U.S. at 853.
55. Id. at 854.
56. See id. at 858.
57. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 199-200 (7th Cir. 1982); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d
342, 345-56 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 443-44 (10th Cir. 1977)
(opinion ordered published 1982) (first case to approve sale of business doctrine).
58. See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v.
Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1981); Reprosystem v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp.
1257, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Anchor-Darling Indus. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v. Verin, 508
F. Supp. 952, 957-58 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Tech Resources, Inc. v. Estate of Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583,
272 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1980); see also Seldin, supra note 53, at 665-68 (excerpts from and compo-
sition of Forman suggest examination of economic reality in any exchange).
59. See Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 443-44 (10th Cir. 1977) (opinion ordered
published 1982).
60. Forman modified Howey by deleting the requirement that profits be earned solely
through the efforts of third parties. 421 U.S. at 852; see supra text accompanying note 56.
61. Forman deleted the word "solely" from the third component of the Howey test. 421
U.S. at 858.
62. See, e.g., Somogyi v. Butler, 518 F. Supp. 970, 984 (D.N.J. 1981) (purchaser of 90%
of company's stock does not receive protection under the Acts); Anchor-Darling Indus. v.
Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (purchaser of controlling interest cannot claim
protection of the Acts).
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
but received the right to control the business's operations. 63 This interpreta-
tion found its basis in that the Acts sought to protect people who had little
or no control over their investment. Therefore, those who could exert con-
trol over their investment fell outside the purview of the Acts.
Courts that refused to accept the sale of business doctrine also used For-
man for support.64 They interpreted Forman as requiring a transaction
analysis only if the label of the instrument failed to match the standard char-
acteristics of such an instrument.65 The Supreme Court would not have en-
gaged in a two-step analysis if the economic realities test always applied. 66
Therefore, the sale of typical stock invoked coverage under the Acts because
the definition of security included stock.6 7 Opponents of the doctrine also
disagreed with the pro-doctrine courts' interpretation of the third part of the
Howey test. They felt that an analysis of control imposed an unnecessary
and unnatural hardship on interpretation of the Acts. 68 These courts found
it unnatural that a purchaser of a fifty-one percent block of shares would not
receive the Acts' protection, while a forty-nine percent purchaser would.
The Court continued to narrow the Acts' scope in Marine Bank v.
Weaver,69 a case that once again brought the issue of the definition of secur-
ity before the Court. The case involved the Weavers' purchase of a certifi-
cate of deposit from Marine Bank and their subsequent pledge to Marine
Bank to guarantee a loan made by Marine to a meat company in exchange
for a fifty percent net profits interest in the company. The opinion acknowl-
edged that the definition of security covered a wide range of instruments, but
noted that the prefatory clause affected the statute's interpretation. 70 The
Acts did not presume to protect all instruments from fraud. 71 The Supreme
Court rejected the Third Circuit's finding that a certificate of deposit resem-
bled the instrument found to be a security in Knight.72 Applying the prefa-
63. See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981); Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952, 957-58 (N.D. I. 1981).
64. One commentator recognized that language in Forman created dueling passages. Sel-
din, supra note 53, at 665.
65. Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1983); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d
1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982); Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1978); Mifflin
Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334, 335-36 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing,
Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp.
925, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
66. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982) (shares of housing project
not securities regardless of economic reality test).
67. Advocates of the sale of business doctrine argued that the holding of the lower court
forced the Supreme Court to engage in the bifurcated approach instead of applying the trans-
action analysis alone. See id. at 1148 (Lumbard, J., dissenting); Easley, supra note 10, at 949
n.164, 961-62; Seldin, supra note 53, at 667-68.
68. See Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1983); Golden v. Garafalo, 687
F.2d 1139, 1146 (2d Cir. 1982); Occidental Life Ins. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255,
1263 (4th Cir. 1974); Note, supra note 13, at 1737-44.
69. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
70. Id. at 556. The Court first considered the prefatory clause for analytical purposes in
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335 (1967).
71. 455 U.S. at 556 (citing Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1255-60 (9th
Cir. 1976)).
72. Knight involved withdrawable capital shares in a savings and loan. Knight differed
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tory clause, the majority found that the federal banking laws provided a
context in which the securities laws should not apply.73 The guarantee of
payment by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provided enough
protection so as to preclude coverage by the Acts. 74
The Supreme Court also rejected the Third Circuit's finding that the busi-
ness agreement in Marine Bank constituted a security. The particular na-
ture of the agreement differed from the instruments usually thought of as
securities. 75 Not only did the agreement fall outside the category of a typical
security, but the majority distinguished the agreement from the instruments
in Joiner and Howey that were classified as securities. 76 The Court noted
that the instruments in Joiner and Howey had the same values to most peo-
ple and could have been sold publicly. 77 The unique qualities of the agree-
ment in Marine Bank prohibited it from being publicly exchanged. 78
Moreover, unlike the Joiner and Howey instruments, the Weavers received
no prospectus prior to the agreement. 79 The Court also found the control
given by the agreement uncharacteristic of a security.80 Finally, the Court
mentioned the equal bargaining strength of the parties to the agreement. 81
These factors justified finding that the agreement was not a security.82
Advocates of excepting from the Acts' coverage stock sales of businesses
accompanied by transfers of control were delighted with the Court's holding
in Marine Bank.8 3 The manner in which the Court used the prefatory clause
supported the context of the transaction position and rejected the statutory
context approach. 84 Furthermore, sales of businesses normally involve equal
bargaining strength, a position that the Marine Bank Court found determi-
native in excepting the transaction in that case from coverage of the Acts.85
Sale of business doctrine proponents considered a certificate of deposit as a
type of note. 86 Since the Court examined the reality of the transaction for an
from Marine Bank because the capital shares purchasers received voting rights and dividends,
not a fixed interest rate. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557.
73. Id. at 558-59.
74. Id. at 558. The Court differentiated certificates of deposit from notes on the basis of
risk. Notes possessed a higher risk of default than certificates of deposit.
75. Id. at 559-60. A provision permitting the respondents to use the barn and grazing
land of the meat company reflected the uniqueness of the agreement.
76. Unlike Joiner and Howey, the meat company did not offer this transaction to a
number of potential investors. Id. Joiner involved the mailing of more than one thousand
prospectuses. Howey had forty-two investors.
77. Id. at 560.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 559-60.
80. Id. at 560.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982).
84. See id.; Easley, supra note 10, at 945. But see Note, supra note 13, at 1727-28 (trans-
action approach to clause stretches clause too far because Congress merely meant clause to
prevent bizarre uses of the Acts).
85. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 560; Easley, supra note 10, at 946.
86. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982); Easley, supra note 10, at 944.
But see Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558; Note, supra note 13, at 1733 (note does not include
certificate of deposit because federal banking laws protect the purchaser).
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instrument included within the definition of security, a "note," then stock
purchases should receive the same sort of reality of the transaction analysis
because "stock" is also listed in the definition of security.8 7
III. LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v LANDRETH
In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth the Court held that stock possessing
typical characteristics of stock plainly fell within the statutory definition of
security.88 The opinion, authored by Justice Powell, noted that previous
Supreme Court opinions did not preclude establishing an instrument as a
security through an examination of the instrument's label and characteris-
tics.8 9 Furthermore, policy reasons concerning the uncertainty of the Acts'
protection supported the Court's holding. Purchasers of typical stock would
expect federal protection,90 and exclusion of the type of transaction involved
in the case would deleteriously affect other sections of the Acts.91
The Court began its substantive analysis with a truism: statutory interpre-
tation begins with the written words.92 In its analysis of the literal meaning
of the definition of security, the Court set forth the 1933 Act's definition of
security, but notably failed to include the prefatory clause, "unless the con-
text otherwise requires."193 The statutory provision plainly demonstrated
that the definition of security included stock. The appellation "stock," how-
ever, did not require the protection of the securities laws according to For-
man.94 Forman required examination of whether the instrument had
important traits normally connected with stock.95
The Court then mentioned a policy consideration. Purchasers of an in-
strument labeled "stock" might rightfully assume that they enjoyed the
Acts' protection when the instrument possessed typical attributes of stock.96
According to the Court, five traits typify an instrument as common stock: a
right to dividends conditioned upon a distribution of earnings; transferabil-
ity; the ability to be used as collateral; voting rights proportionate to amount
87. See Easley, supra note 10, at 959; Seldin, supra note 53, at 669-70. But see Daily v.
Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1983) (Marine Bank supports position of doctrine oppo-
nents as well as advocates).
88. 105 S. Ct. at 2303, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 698. The Court previously noted the issue
presented in Landreth, but failed to address it. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
521 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13-14 n.10 (1971).
89. 105 S. Ct. at 2304, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 700.
90. Id. at 2306, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 702.
91. Id. at 2305, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 701.
92. Id. at 2301, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 696-97.
93. Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982). Sale of business advocates used
the clause as a basis for their position.
94. 421 U.S. at 848.
95. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2302, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 697 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 851).
The Court ignored Forman's analysis of the underlying transaction. 105 S. Ct. at 2302, 85 L.
Ed. 2d at 697. This disregard of the complete Forman analysis foreshadowed the Court's
holding.




of shares held; and the potential to increase in value.97
The majority effectively used these five traits to distinguish Landreth from
Forman. The purchasers in Forman could not have thought that they had
bought a security since the stock possessed none of the typical characteristics
of common stock and the purchasers bought the stock in order to obtain
housing for their own use.98 In Landreth the parties did not dispute that the
stock had the five typical stock traits.99 Also, unlike Forman, the facts of
Landreth, the sale of stock of a corporation, seemed to fit the context of the
Acts' definition. 1°° The Court echoed its concern that an investor would
think his purchase fell within the scope of the Acts.' 0 ' The language of the
definition coupled with the policy concerns required finding that the stock in
Landreth constituted a security. 10 2
Although the statutory analysis suggested judgment in favor of the peti-
tioner timber company, 10 3 the Court discussed the arguments of the respon-
dents and the lower court. The respondents, the Landreths, argued that
Forman, Knight, and Marine Bank all required an inquiry into the economic
reality of the exchange to resolve whether, under the Howey test, the defini-
tion of security included the stock instrument at bar. 104 The respondents
further reasoned that the petitioners failed to meet the third condition of the
Howey test because the purchase brought with it control of the company. 105
Congress, they argued, intended to protect transactions involving inactive
investors, not confidential transactions involving entrepreneurs who would
control the operations of the business themselves rather than rely on
others.'0 6 The respondents' argument seemed to liken entrepreneurs to the
Forman purchasers who controlled and used their homes and did not receive
the protection of the Acts.
The Court found three distinct faults with the respondents' arguments.
First, the Court held that the cases the respondents relied on all involved
atypical instruments not normally classified as securities. 10 7 The economic
97. 105 S. Ct. at 2302, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 697-98. The Court first identified these traits in
Forman, 421 U.S. at 851.
98. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2302, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
99. Id. at 2302-03, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 698. One advocate of the sale of business doctrine
argues that all purchasers buy stock for their own use. Thompson, supra note 11, at 243. But
see Note, supra note 13, at 1737-38 (buyers of businesses purchase with a hope for profits,
other buyers consume their purchases).
100. 105 S. Ct. at 2303, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
101. Id.; see id. at 2302, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 697.
102. Id. at 2303, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 698. The Court saw its reading of the Acts in harmony
with Congress's purpose of guarding investors. The Court acknowledged that the Acts did not
cover all fraud. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, to exclude the stock
in Landreth would unjustifiably limit the expansive definition of security. Note, supra note 13,
at 1730.
103. The Court cited L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 212 (1983)
as an authority for the proposition that a statutory examination alone is adequate. 105 S. Ct.
at 2303 n.3, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 698 n.3.
104. 105 S. Ct. at 2304, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 699-700.
105. Id. at 2306-07, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 703.
106. See id.; Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982).
107. 105 S. Ct. at 2304, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 700. In a footnote the Court questionably labeled
the certificate of deposit in Marine Bank as an unusual instrument. Id. n.4.
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substance behind the exchange provided the only vehicle to prove those in-
struments fell within the typical conception of a security.' 08 The instrument
in this case did not require an analysis beyond its characteristics to deter-
mine whether it constituted a security because traditional stock came clearly
within the definition of security. 10 9 The majority stated that previous opin-
ions had not eliminated the likelihood that stock would constitute a security
if it possessed traditional qualities.I 10
The Court also attacked the respondents' understanding of the Howey test.
That test involved whether a particular instrument fell within the term "in-
vestment contract.""' The Court stated that the test need not apply to all
terms listed in the Acts' definition because using the test to define each spe-
cific term would make their listing needless. 1 2
The majority also rejected the investor/entrepreneur distinction suggested
by the respondents. 113 The Court based its position on the use of the term
"security" in other sections of the 1934 Act. 114 Excepting entrepreneurial
instruments from the definition of security would contradict the reasons be-
hind these sections. 115 Moreover, although the 1933 Act exempts private
transactions, such as entrepreneurial dealings, from its registration require-
ments, entrepreneurial transactions are still subject to the 1933 Act's an-
tifraud provisions. 1 6
After disposing of the respondents' arguments, the Court discussed the
Third Circuit's worry that establishing stock as a security by proving its
characteristics would require treating other instruments listed in the defini-
tion of security, like notes, in an identical manner. 1 7 The Court declined to
decide whether the approach used in this case applied to other specific in-
struments named in the statute because, in the Court's view, stock consti-
tuted a special situation.118 First, most people picture stock as a security. 119
108. Id. at 2304, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 700.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Court cited passages from Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352-55, and Forman, 421 U.S.
at 849-58, as support for this principle. The Forman court had called the Joiner language used
here dictum. Forman, 421 U.S. at 850.
111. 105S. Ct. at 2305, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 701.
112. Id. (citing Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982)). The Court ex-
plained that although it had equated investment contracts with instruments typically thought
of as securities, it did not intend the Howey test to apply whenever a case allegedly involved a
security. 105 S. Ct. at 2305 n.5, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 701 n.5.
113. Id. at 2305, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 701.
114. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 14, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, 78p (1982). These
sections regulate tender offers and disclosure of insider dealings.
115. 105 S. Ct. at 2305, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 701; see Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 503 (5th
Cir. 1983); Schneider, The Sale of a Business Doctrine-Another View, 37 Sw. L.J. 461, 485-86
(1983). But see Easley, supra note 10, at 965-66 (tender offer concerns do not require rejection
of the doctrine).
116. 105 S. Ct. at 2305, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 701 (citing Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 503 (5th
Cir. 1983)). But see Easley, supra note 10, at 956 (Daily court confused exception with
exemption).
117. The appellate court failed to see how stock could be distinguished from other instru-
ments. The Supreme Court found that stock deserved special treatment by its very nature, and
courts did not have to rationalize the difference in treatment.
118. 105 S. Ct. at 2306, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 702.
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The Court again returned to the idea that people probably expect protection
when they purchase stock because it is the most common type of security.120
Second, one can identify stock with comparative ease because it has the five
particular characteristics.121 A note, on the other hand, includes instruments
that possess differing attributes. 122
In Part IV of its opinion the Court discussed additional policy reasons
against the sale of business doctrine. 123 The majority expressed grave con-
cern over application of the doctrine hinging on whether the purchaser had
assumed control. 124 A critical question in the Court's mind was whether
control had passed in this case since the buyers had never intended to man-
age the company. 125 The Court noted that even proponents of the doctrine
argue that a buyer who has the capability to exert control but chooses not to
do so merits the Acts' protection. 126
Of more import, that Court stated that approval of the sale of business
doctrine would present complex issues of line drawing because the doctrine
would apply to sales of less than one hundred percent of a company's
shares. 127 Coverage would then depend on a variety of factors such as the
number of buyers, voting and veto agreements, and the percentage of stock
exchanged. 128 At the time of sale neither party would know whether the
Acts applied. 129 This doubt would not serve either party's interest.' 30
Justice Stevens's dissent argued that Congress never intended the Acts to
protect every transaction that included an instrument listed in one of the
Acts' definitions.' 3 ' The prefatory clause reinforced this interpretation. 132
The legislative history of the Acts demonstrated that Congress was con-
cerned with securities exchanged in the public arena. 133 Congress desired to
guard investors who did not possess the leverage to receive inside informa-
119. Id.; see Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1983); L. Loss, supra note 103,
at 212.
120. 105 S. Ct. at 2302, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 697.
121. Id. at 2302, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 697-98.
122. Id. at 2306, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 702.
123. The majority had already mentioned one policy concern three times. Id. at 2302, 85
L. Ed. 2d at 697-98.
124. Id. at 2307, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 703-04; see Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1146
(1982). But see id. at 1149 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (majority's concerns not based on the
facts of other cases).
125. 105 S. Ct. at 2307, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 703. This clearly contradicted the appellate court's
finding. 731 F.2d at 1353.
126. 105 S. Ct. at 2307, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 703-04 (citing Easley, supra note 10, at 971-72); see
Seldin, supra note 53, at 679. Whether the tenor of these articles reflects the Court's interpre-
tation of them remains open to question.
127. 105 S. Ct. at 2307, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 704. But see Easley, supra note 10, at 958 n.226
(courts often draw more difficult distinctions); Seldin, supra note 53, at 678 (same).
128. 105 S. Ct. at 2307, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 704.
129. Id.; see Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1983); Golden v. Garafalo, 678
F.2d 1139, 1146 (1982). But see id. at 1149-50 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (contractual protec-
tions may prevent uncertainty).
130. 105 S. Ct. at 2307, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 704.
131. Id. at 2312, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 705.
132. Id.; see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 335 (1967).
133. 105 S. Ct. at 2312, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 704.
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tion or the ability to protect themselves with contractual provisions. 134 Jus-
tice Stevens further argued that no distinction should exist between an
analysis of stock and notes1 35 because parties to a sale of a business may use
a sale of stock for reasons unrelated to the federal securities law policy of
protecting investors.1 3 6 Justice Stevens acknowledged that some doubt
about the Acts' scope would result from his dissent, but he felt that the harm
of extending the Acts' protection beyond Congress's initial concern out-
weighed the majority's concern that investors be assured of protection in all
cases.1 37
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of Landreth the Acts cover the sale of stock, even if a transfer
of control results from the sale, so long as the transferred stock has the usual
characteristics of stock. To remain outside the control of the Acts, the par-
ties must structure the sale of a business as a sale of assets and not stock.
Throughout the opinion the Court emphasized that most people consider
stock as a security. This repeated concern demonstrates that this policy con-
sideration provided the primary basis for the Court's interpretation of the
definition of security. Whether specifically labeled instruments other than




135. Id. at 2313, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 705; see Seldin, supra note 53, at 669-70.
136. 105 S. Ct. at 2313, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 706. These reasons include tax obligations, assigna-
bility of instruments, and the apportionment of liabilities.
137. Id. (citing Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1982)). The majority argued
that the uncertainty of the Acts' coverage outweighed any other considerations. 105 S. Ct. at
2307, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 704. But see Easley, supra note 10, at 946-65 (parties can create certainty
with contractual provisions).
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